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Abstract
A model of adaptive learning and innovation is used to simulate the evolution of nite automata
in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. The automata are prone to two types of errors:
(a) implementation errors and (b) perception errors. The computational experiments incorporate
dierent levels of errors in an eort to assess whether and how the distribution of outcomes
and structures in the population changes. Under the proposed framework, the incorporation of
implementation and perception errors is sucient to reduce cooperative outcomes. In addition,
the study identies a threshold error-level. At and above the threshold error-level, the prevailing
structures converge to the open-loop (history-independent) automaton Always-Defect. On the
other hand, below the threshold, the prevailing structures are closed-loop (history-dependent) and
diverse. The diversity thus impedes any inferential projections on the superiority of a particular
automaton. Yet, the analysis still identies some broad characteristics of the automata that
work \reasonably well" in such environments. In particular, the complexity of the automata is
decreasing in the probability of errors. Furthermore, the prevailing structures tend to exhibit
low reciprocal cooperation and low tolerance to defections. These results show that the evolution
of cooperative automata is considerably weaker than expected, while the change in the model is
ecologically plausible: errors are common in strategic situations.
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The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) stage-game has become the theoretical gold standard
to investigate social interactions; its importance stems from defying commonsense reasoning
and highlighting the omnipresent conict of interests amongst unrelated agents. Yet, Robert
Axelrod (1984) argued that reciprocal cooperation is likely to evolve when individuals inter-
act repeatedly.1 In real-life however, there is a plethora of situations where non-cooperative
outcomes evolve; some, even in the presence of frequent encounters. Consider for example,
the world of sports. In wrestling, the prevalent practice is for wrestlers to intentionally lose
unnaturally large amounts of weight so as to compete against lighter opponents. In doing so,
wrestlers are, clearly, not at their top level of physical and athletic tness; yet often, end up
competing against the same opponents who followed the same practice.
In this paper, it is argued that the evolution of cooperation in the PD game is not a stable
and robust result, but a product of the assumption that agents are hyper-rational. Agents, in
real life, are not hyper-rational but engage in actions that are constrained by the limitations of
human nature and the surrounding environment. Thus, oftentimes agents suer from a measure
of uncertainty about their own as well as their colleagues' actions. In large and complex rms
for example, division chiefs are often physically removed from each other and are consequently
unable to observe each other's behavior directly. Uncertainty in this context, takes the form of
perception errors; that is, errors in the transmission of information. Moreover, division chiefs
are prone to implementation errors; that is, errors in the implementation of their own actions
along the lines of Selten's trembling hand. Due to these disturbances, the decision-makers may
occasionally draw incorrect inferences about their peers' actions.
The primary objective of this work is to build on existing models of adaptive learning and in-
novation to simulate an evolving, error-prone population that plays the repeated PD paradigm.
A secondary objective of the study is to assess whether and how the distribution of outcomes
1In 1979, Axelrod invited professionals from various elds to submit computer programs for a PD simulation.
The computer programs (14 entries) were used in lieu of agents' strategies, specifying actions contingent upon
the opponent's reported actions. The programs were matched against each other in a round-robin structure and
against their twin. The simulation was repeated in 1983 (63 entries). The results of both tournaments were a
clear victory for Tit-For-Tat (TFT); a strategy that starts o by cooperating and then imitates the most recent
action of the opponent.
1and strategies in the population changes via computational experiments that incorporate dif-
ferent levels of errors. Finally, the study identies and discusses behavioral patterns that fare
well in the simulated environments.
According to the thought experiment, a group of agents is set to play the PD game. Each
agent is required to submit a strategy that is implemented by a type of nite automaton called a
Moore machine (Moore 1956). The machine species actions contingent upon the opponent's
reported actions. The agents play the PD game against each other and against their twin
in a round-robin structure. Bounded rationality is introduced in this context, in the form of
implementation errors and perception errors. Thus, the machines of the agents are subjected
to implementation and perception errors. With the completion of all round-matches, the actual
scores and machines of every agent become common knowledge. Based on this information,
agents update their machines for the next generation.
Under the proposed framework, the incorporation of implementation and perception errors
is sucient to reduce cooperative outcomes. In addition, by varying the error-level, the study
identies a threshold error-level. At and above the threshold error-level, the prevailing struc-
tures converge to the open-loop (history-independent) automaton Always-Defect. On the other
hand, below the threshold, the prevailing structures are closed-loop (history-dependent) and
diverse, which impedes any inferential projections on the superiority of a particular machine.
Yet, the analysis still identies some broad characteristics of the machines that work \reason-
ably well" in such environments. First, the complexity of the machines, dened as the number
of accessible states, is decreasing in the probability of errors. Furthermore, the prevailing struc-
tures tend to exhibit low reciprocal cooperation and low tolerance to the opponents' defections.
These results show that the evolution of cooperative machines is considerably weaker than
expected, while the change in the model is ecologically plausible: errors are common in our
strategic interactions.
The study aims to contribute in several important lines of research. First, this study aims
to elicit an understanding of the patterns of reasoning of agent-based behaviors in the presence
of errors. Conventional game theory rests on the foundations that agents are hyper-rational
with full ability to select the most-preferred action. Yet, the latter is rarely justied as an
empirically realistic assumption. Rather, it is usually defended on methodological grounds as
the appropriate theoretical framework to analyze behavior. On the contrary, the incorporation
2of bounded rationality in the proposed context is a viable alternative and consequently, one that
merits further investigation. Thus, it becomes pertinent to discern behavioral patterns that
fare well in the error-prone environments. Second, the computational results of this study aim
to generate insights into behavioral patterns that can spur theoretical research. In particular,
the descriptive results on the properties of the prevailing structures could potentially guide
theorists in their investigation of renements of the Nash equilibrium concept.2 Third, the
study also contributes to a better understanding of how small error-perturbations in the agents'
strategies change the set of prevailing structures. In addition, by varying the error-level, the
study identies a threshold level of errors. At and above the threshold error-level, the prevailing
structures converge to the open-loop automaton Always-Defect, whereas below the threshold,
the prevailing structures are closed-loop and diverse.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related literature is reviewed
while in Section 3, the concept of a Moore machine as the carrier of an adaptive agent's strategy
is presented. In Section 4, the choice of the genetic algorithm, as the appropriate search
algorithm to model the strategic choices of agents, is justied. In Section 5, the methodology
is explained. In Section 6, a parenthetical theoretical analysis on a treatment based on Markov
chains is provided. In Section 7, the study focusses on the results of the evolutionary process
while elaborating on broad characteristics of the evolutionary machines. In Section 8, the
properties of the machines are discussed and compared to the results of previous studies. Finally,
in the Conclusion, direction for future research is oered.
2The multiple-equilibrium problem is a substantial problem in game theory. Since the late 1970s there has
been a urry of renements of the Nash equilibrium, each renement being motivated by the desire to get rid of
certain implausible or fragile Nash equilibria (see Van Damme (1987) for an excellent account of this research
eld). The desire to get rid of certain Nash equilibria has been necessitated by the work of Andrew McLennan
(1997) and in collaboration with McKelvey (1997). These studies indicate that randomly-generated games with
many agents and strategies usually have huge numbers of equilibria. As Myerson (2002) points out, if theorists
found an evolutionary model that would always (for any game) converge to some nonempty set of equilibria,
then this set would constitute an important renement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
32 Literature Review
The study is related to several strands of literature in evolutionary game theory. First, it
is related to the large literature on optimization routines. The genetic algorithm (Holland
1975) is one of many search techniques developed for solving hard combinatorial optimization
problems in large search spaces. Other optimization techniques include: Simulated Annealing
(Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecche 1983), Tabu Search (Glover and Laguna 1993), Stochastic Hill
Climbing and Compset Algorithm (Hamo and Markovitch 2005). Axelrod (1987) was the rst to
model the evolutionary process of the repeated PD game with a genetic algorithm. Nevertheless,
his study was restricted by his use of strategies whose actions were contingent to the action
proles of (only) the last three periods, and by his use of a xed environment composed of
(only) eight strategies. On the other hand, Miller (1996) circumvented these restrictions by the
use of a variable environment where strategies co-evolved as the strategic population changed.
In addition, Miller used automata to enable the denition of many theoretically important
strategies (for example, strategies relying on counting or triggers) that could not be dened
under the framework of Axelrod.
Miller's approach is used in this formulation as well. Using nite automata as the carriers
of agents' strategies was rst suggested by Aumann (1981) for the study of decision-making
with bounded rationality. The rst application originated in the work of Neyman (1985) who
investigated a nitely-repeated game model in which the pure strategies available to the agents
were those which could be generated by machines utilizing no more than a certain number
of states. Ben-Porath (1990) and Megiddo in collaboration with Widgerson (1985) also pur-
sued this line of enquiry; the latter in the context of Turing machines. Additionally, several
researchers have studied the eect of complexity on the set of equilibria in repeated games
with nite automata. Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) for one, showed that if agents' preferences
are increasing in repeated-game payos and decreasing in the complexity of the strategies em-
ployed, then the set of Nash-equilibrium payos that can occur is dramatically reduced from
the folk-theorem result (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). Yet, they indicate that a wide variety
of payos remains consistent with equilibrium behavior in the presence of complexity costs. It
is noteworthy that Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), just like the other papers mentioned, dene
the complexity of a strategy as the size of the minimal automaton implementing it. On the
4other hand, Banks and Sundaram (1990) argue that the traditional number-of-states measure of
complexity of an automaton neglects some essential features such as informational requirements
at a state. They propose instead, a criterion of complexity which takes into account both the
size (number of states) and transitional structure of a machine. Under this proposition, they
prove that the resulting Nash equilibria of the machine-game are now trivial: the machines
recommend actions every period that are invariably stage-game Nash equilibria.
Finally, the current paper builds on the literature of computational simulations studying
repeated games with stochasticity. Bendor, Kramer and Stout (1991) have been, to my knowl-
edge, the rst to conduct a computer tournament with random shocks. In their study, the
authors re-evaluate the performance of reciprocating strategies such as TFT and identify al-
ternative strategies that sustain cooperation in an environment with random shocks. The
computer tournament is constructed in a manner similar to the tournament of Axelrod. The
winning strategy in their tournament is Nice-And-Forgiving (NAF) which diers in many ways
from TFT.3 First, NAF is nice in the sense that it cooperates as long as the frequency of
cooperation of the opponent is above some threshold. Second, NAF is forgiving in the sense
that although NAF retaliates if the opponent's cooperation falls below the threshold level of
cooperation, it reverts to full cooperation before its opponent does, as long as certain minimal
levels of cooperation are met by the opponent.
3 Finite Automata
A nite automaton is a mathematical model of a system with discrete inputs and outputs. The
system can be in any one of a nite number of internal congurations or \states". The state
of the system summarizes the information concerning past inputs that is needed to determine
the behavior of the system on subsequent inputs. The specic type of nite automaton used
here is a Moore machine (Moore 1956). Let I denote the set of agents, Ai denote the set of
i's actions, A denote the cartesian product of the action spaces Ai written as A 
I

i=1
Ai, and
gi : A ! < denote the real-valued utility function of i. Thus, a Moore machine for an adaptive
agent i in a repeated game of G = (I,fAigi2I;fgigi2I) is a four-tuple (Qi, qi
0, fi, i) where Qi
3TFT's performance was mediocre, placing eight out of thirteen strategies.
5is a nite set of internal states of which qi
0 is specied to be the initial state, fi : Qi ! Ai is an
output function that assigns an action to every state, and i : Qi  A i ! Qi is the transition
function that assigns a state to every two-tuple of state and other agent's action. It is pertinent
to note that the transition function depends only on the present state and the other agent's
action. This formalization ts the natural description of a strategy as agent i's plan of action
in all possible circumstances that are consistent with agent i's plans. In contrast, the notion of
a game-theoretic strategy for agent i requires the specication of an action for every possible
history, including those that are inconsistent with agent i's plan of action.4
In the rst period, the state is qi
0 and the machine chooses the action fi(qi
0). If a i is
the action chosen by the other agent in the rst period, then the state of agent i's machine
changes to i(qi
0;a i), and in the second period agent i chooses the action dictated by fi in
that state. Then, the state changes again according to the transition function given the other
agent's action. Thus, whenever the machine is in some state q, it chooses the action fi(q) while
the transition function i species the machine's transition from q (to a state) in response to
the action taken by the other agent.
CC , D
D start C D
Figure 1: Grim-Trigger machine
Qi = fqC;qDg
qi
0 = qC
fi(qC) = C and fi(qD) = D
i(q;a i) = f
qC (q;a i)=(qC;C)
qD otherwise
For example the machine (Qi, qi
0, fi, i) in Figure 1, carries out the Grim-Trigger strategy
in the context of the PD game. Thus, the strategy chooses C so long as both agents have
chosen C in every period in the past, and chooses D otherwise. In the transition diagram, the
4To formulate the game-theoretic strategy, one would have to construct the transition function such that
i : Qi  A ! Qi instead of i : Qi  A i ! Qi.
6vertices denote the internal states of the machine and the arcs labeled with the action of the
other agent, indicate the transition to the states.
Bounded rationality is introduced in the form of random errors committed by the machines.
More specically, the study considers errors in the implementation of actions and errors in the
perception of actions. Implementation and perception errors when considered in isolation lead
to quite dierent results. For instance, the machine Contrite-Tit-For-Tat in the repeated PD
game is proof against errors in implementation but not against errors in perception. The ma-
chine acts in principle as Tit-For-Tat, but enters a \contrite" state if it erroneously implements
a defection rather than a cooperation. Consequently, the machine accepts the opponent's re-
taliation and cooperates for the next two periods but leaves the contrite state soon after. On
the other hand, if the machine Contrite-Tit-For-Tat mistakenly perceives that the opponent de-
fected, will respond with a defection without switching to the contrite state and will not meekly
accept any subsequent retaliation. It is therefore crucial to formally dene implementation and
perception errors in the context of Moore machines.
Denition 1 The machine of agent i in the PD game commits an implementation error
with probability , when for any given state q, the machine0s output function returns the
action fi(q) with probability 1    and draws another action \fi(q)" where fi(q)6=\fi(q)"
otherwise.5
That is, an implementation error level of  indicates that with probability  the course
of action dictated by the particular state of the machine will be altered. For example, a
cooperation dictated by the particular state will be implemented erroneously as a defection
with probability . On the other hand, perception errors are dened as follows.
Denition 2 The machine of agent i in the PD game commits a perception error with
probability , when for any given opponent0s action a i, the machine inputs the opponent0s
action a i into the transition function with probability 1  and inputs the opponent0s action
\a i" into the transition function where a i6=\a i" otherwise.
5A more general denition would postulate that the machine of agent i commits an implementation error
with probability , when for any given state q, the machine0s output function returns the action fi(q) with
probability 1    and draws another action ai 2 Ai n fi(q) randomly and uniformly otherwise. However,
since the action space in the PD game consists of only two actions, the former denition suces.
7Thus, a perception error level of  indicates that with probability  an opponent's action is
reported incorrectly, while with probability 1   the opponent's action is perfectly transmitted.
Furthermore, the study considers machines that hold no more than eight internal states. The
choice to keep the upper bound on the number of internal states at eight is a considered
decision. First, such a bound is reasonable given complexity considerations. As Rubinstein
(1986) indicates, agents seek to device behavioral patterns which do not need to be constantly
reassessed and which economize on the number of states needed to operate eectively in a given
strategic environment. A more complex plan of action is more likely to break down, is more
dicult to learn, and may require more time to be executed. In fact, a number of studies (some
with subjects in the laboratory) have been suggestive of the eectiveness of simple strategies
over more complex ones in a wide range of environments (Axelrod 1984; Rust, Miller and
Palmer 1994; Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich 1997). Second, the choice of eight internal states
allows for a sucient variety of machines to emerge; machines that incorporate a diverse array
of characteristics.6
Next, in order to examine the impact of implementation and perception errors on the dis-
tribution of outcomes and structures, various computational experiments were conducted. The
probability of occurrence of implementation and perception errors, in these computational ex-
periments, is kept constant throughout the duration of the evolution at dierent levels. It is
important to note that for these notions of errors to make sense in the context of the repeated
PD game, a delay in the aggregation of the payos is required (otherwise, the payo information
would be sucient to reveal the actual action). Examples of situations with delayed payos
and imperfect verication include, among others, arms treaties and oligopolistic production
agreements.
4 The Genetic Algorithm
The genetic algorithm is an evolutionary search algorithm that manipulates important schemata
based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics (Holland 1975). Other descrip-
6To test the robustness of the results with respect to the size selection, computational experiments with
machines that held 16 states were conducted. The computations performed, conrm that the results are robust.
8tive constructs, such as replicator dynamics or evolutionary stable strategies, lack the ability
to incorporate forms of innovation. The present search algorithm however, removes this re-
striction by allowing for innovative processes to enter the model in a tractable manner. The
genetic algorithm was developed by Holland (1975) for optimization problems in dicult do-
mains. Dicult domains are those with both enormous search spaces and objective functions
with many local optima, discontinuities and high dimensionality.
The search for an appropriate way to model strategic choices of agents has been a central
topic in the study of game theory. The genetic algorithm is an attractive choice because it
combines survival of the ttest with a structured information exchange that emulates some of
the innovative air of human search. Initially, the algorithm requires the natural parameter set
of the optimization problem to be coded as a nite-length string over some nite alphabet. As
a result, the algorithm is largely unconstrained by the limitations of other optimization meth-
ods that require continuity, the existence of derivatives and uni-modality. More specically,
in order to perform an eective search for better structures, a genetic algorithm requires pay-
o values associated with the individual strings, in sharp contrast to calculus-based methods
that require derivatives (calculated analytically or numerically). This characteristic makes the
genetic algorithm a more canonical method than many other search schemes. Furthermore,
a genetic algorithm searches from a rich database of points simultaneously, thus avoiding, to
a large extent, false peaks in multi-modal search spaces. Finally, the genetic algorithm uses
stochastic transition rules to guide the search. While randomized, the algorithm is no simple
random walk. Instead, the genetic algorithm uses random choice as a tool to guide a search
toward regions of the search space with expected improved performance.
The mechanics of the genetic algorithm involve copying strings and altering states through
the operators of selection and mutation. Initially, reproduction is a process where successful
strings proliferate while unsuccessful strings die o. Copying strings according to their payo
or tness values is an articial version of Darwinian selection of the ttest among string struc-
tures. After reproduction, selection results to higher proportions of similar successful strings.
The mechanics of reproduction and selection are simple, involving random number generation,
string-copying and string-selection. Nonetheless, the combined emphasis of reproduction and
the structured selection give the genetic algorithm much of its power. On the other hand,
mutation is an insurance policy against premature loss of important notions. Even though re-
9production and selection eectively search and recombine extant notions, occasionally they may
become overzealous and lose some potentially useful material. In articial systems, mutation
protects against such an irrecoverable loss. Consequently, these operators bias the system to-
wards certain building blocks that are consistently associated with above-average performance.7
Darwinian mechanics are a continuation of the approach that agents are neither fully rational
nor knowledgeable enough to correctly anticipate the other agents' strategies. In particular, the
process describes how agents adjust their plans of action over time as they learn from experience
about the other agents' strategies. Yet, the dynamics also reect the limited ability of the
agents to receive, decode and act upon the information they get in the course of the evolution.
With the completion of all round-matches, not all agents need to react instantaneously to the
environment. The idea is that the observations of the agents are imperfect since their knowledge
on how payos depend on strategy-choices is tenuous. Thus, changing one's strategy can
potentially be costly. In addition, agents are part of a system. Agents learn what constitutes
a good strategy by observing what has worked well for other people. Hence, agents tend
to emulate or imitate others' strategies that proved successful. In turn, to the extent that
there is substantial inertia present, only a small fraction of agents are changing their strategies
simultaneously. In this case, those who do change their strategies are justied in making
moderate changes: after all, they know that only a small segment of the population changes its
behavior at any given point in time hence, strategies that remain eective today are likely to
remain eective for some time in the future. It is for these reasons, that the genetic algorithm
is an appropriate search engine to model adaptive-learning behavior and innovation.
5 Methodology
The genetic algorithm requires the natural parameter set of the optimization problem to be
coded as a nite-length string over some nite alphabet. Each Moore machine here, is thus
represented by a string of 25 elements. The rst element provides the starting state of the
machine. Eight three-element packets are then arrayed on the string. Each packet represents
7For a more detailed discussion on genetic algorithms refer to the book by Goldberg (1989). No previous
knowledge of genetic algorithms is required to understand the description of this genetic algorithm.
10an internal state of the machine. The rst bit, within an internal state, describes the action
dictated by the particular state (1 := cooperate;0 := defect). The next element, within an
internal state, gives the transition state if the opponent is observed to cooperate, and the nal
element, within an internal state, gives the transition state if the opponent is observed to defect.
Given that each string can utilize up to eight states, the scheme allows the denition of any
Moore machine of eight states or less.
For example, take the machine that implements TFT in Figure 2. The machine only needs
to remember the opponent's last action hence utilizes only two states; the last six states are
redundant as illustrated in the coding.8
CD
D
C
start C D
Figure 2: Tit-For-Tat machine
0 |{z}
initial state
1 0 1 | {z }
state 0
0 0 1 | {z }
state 1
0 0 0 | {z }
state 2
0 0 0 | {z }
state 3
0 0 0 | {z }
state 4
0 0 0 | {z }
state 5
0 0 0 | {z }
state 6
0 0 0 | {z }
state 7
The genetic algorithm consists of a number of generations. Each generation starts with
a given population called the parent population. A new population of the same size is then
constructed called the offspring population. In this formulation, the genetic algorithm oper-
ates with a population of machines. Each machine represents an agent's strategy. Initially, a
population of thirty machines is chosen at random. Then, each machine is tested against the
environment (which is composed of the other machines and its twin). The game-play occurs
for 200 periods per match. Each machine, thus aggregates a raw score based on the payos
illustrated in Table 1. The ospring population is constructed from the parent population, by
selecting the machines that aggregated the top twenty scores. In addition, ten new structures
8Given this layout, there are 259 possible structures. Yet, the total number of unique structures is much less
since some of the machines are isomorphic. For example, every two-state machine such as Tit-For-Tat can be
renamed in any of (P8
2)(242) ways.
11Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3,3 0,5
Defect 5,0 1,1
Table 1: Prisoner's Dilemma Matrix
are created via a process of selection and mutation. The process requires the draw of ten pairs
of machines from the parent population (with the probabilities biased by their scores) and the
selection of the better performer from each pair. Then, these ten machines undergo a process
of mutation. Mutation occurs when an element at a random location on the selected string
changes value. Each element on the string is subjected to a 4% independent chance of mutation,
which implies an expectation of 1 element-mutation per string.9 The population is iterated for
500 generations. The adaptive plan is summarized below in Figures 3 and 4.
9A higher mutation rate increases the variation in the population; as a result, in such an environment
the machine Always-Defect is hugely favored. The computational simulations performed with higher rates of
mutation (8% and 12% independent chance of mutation per element which imply an expectation of 2 and
3 elements-mutation per string, respectively) conrm this claim. On the other hand, the choice of a 4%
independent chance of mutation is a conservative one that allows forms of innovation to appear in the structure
of the machines while controlling for the variation in the population.
12Specify error-level 
Fix max-periods = 200 
 
Create initial population: 30 agents (seed randomly) 
Initiate round-robin tournament 
 
For t = 1 to 500 do 
 
  For all agent-pairs do 
    For p = 1 to max-periods do 
      Award utils to each agent based on the PD matrix 
  End  loop 
 
  Output  performance  score 
 End  loop 
 
  Apply subroutine for the offspring-population-creation 
  Store agent results 
 
End loop 
Figure 3: Pseudocode of the Main Program
Sort agents based on performance score 
 
Copy top 20 agents to offspring-population 
 
Select 10 agent-pairs via probabilities biased by performance scores 
 
For each of 10 pairs do 
  Create new agent as a copy of the winner of the pair’s match 
  Mutate new agent by switching one element at random 
 
End loop 
 
 
  Figure 4: Subroutine of the Ospring-Population-Creation
6 Theoretical Preliminaries
To facilitate a better understanding of the impact of errors on the payos of the machines, the
outcome of a nite but innitely-evolving population, inhabited by a single type of a stochastic
machine is analytically tracked. The analysis is restricted to two cases. In the rst case, the
13population is composed of Tit-For-Tat machines and in the second case, the population is
composed of Always-Defect machines.
The Prisoner's Dilemma payo-matrix is provided in Table 1. At the end of each period,
one of four outcomes is realized. The transition rules are labeled by quadruples (s1;s2;s3;s4) of
zeros and ones. The rst position denotes cooperation from both agents, the second and third
positions denote unilateral cooperation by the rst and second agent respectively, and nally,
the last position denotes defection from both agents. In this context, si is 1 if the machine
plays Cooperate and 0 if the machine plays Defect, after outcome i (i = 1;2;3;4) is realized.
For instance, (1;0;1;0) is the transition rule of Tit-For-Tat and (0;0;0;0) is the transition rule
of Always-Defect. For convenience, these rules are labeled as STFT and SALLD respectively.
Suppose that the machines are subjected to implementation and perception errors. Let 
denote the probability of committing an implementation error, and  denote the probability of
committing a perception error.
More generally, let a stochastic machine have transition rules p = (p1;p2;p3;p4) where pi is
any number between 0 and 1 denoting the probability of cooperating after the corresponding
outcome of the previous period. The space of all such rules is the four-dimensional unit cube;
the corners are just the degenerate transition rules. A rule p = (p1;p2;p3;p4) that is matched
against a rule q = (q1;q2;q3;q4) yields a Markov process where the transitions between the four
possible states10 are given by the matrix
0
B B B B B
@
p1q1 p1(1   q1) (1   p1)q1 (1   p1)(1   q1)
p2q3 p2(1   q3) (1   p2)q3 (1   p2)(1   q3)
p3q2 p3(1   q2) (1   p3)q2 (1   p3)(1   q2)
p4q4 p4(1   q4) (1   p4)q4 (1   p4)(1   q4)
1
C C
C C C
A
:
If p and q are in the interior of the strategy cube, then all entries of this stochastic matrix
are strictly positive; hence there exists a unique stationary distribution  = (1;2;3;4)
such that p
(n)
i , the probability to be in state i in the nth period, converges to i for n ! 1
(i = 1;2;3;4). It follows that the payo for agent i using p against agent  i using q is given
by
10To be consistent with the conventional notation in Markov chains, the word \outcome" is replaced with the
word \state".
14A(p;q) = 31 + 53 + 4: (1)
Notice that the i and also the payos are independent of the initial condition (in other
words, of the actions of the agents in the rst period). For any error level ; > 0, the payo
obtained by a machine using a transition rule Si against a machine with transition rule S i can
be computed via (1).11 The transition rules of Tit-For-Tat and Always-Defect in the presence
of errors are shown in Table 2. Assuming that implementation and perception errors are each
kept constant at 4%, the invariant distributions of Tit-For-Tat and Always-Defect yield 2:25
and 1:12 utils, respectively.
7 Results
In order to assess how the distribution of outcomes and structures in the population changes,
four computational experiments were conducted. The computational experiments incorporate
dierent levels of errors. In particular, the machines are subjected to a constant independent
chance of implementation and perception errors of 4%, 2%, 1% and 0%, respectively. In the
absence of a theoretical background on the functional form of the model, non-parametric meth-
ods are used to carry out the estimation. More specically, local polynomial regression was
used to t the dependent variables over the course of the evolution. The dependent variables
were found to exhibit non-stationary12 behavior which is attributed to the selection dynamics of
the genetic algorithm. All the smoothed curves presented next, utilize rst-ordered polynomial
functions which are found in the literature to be quite eective in balancing the bias-variance
trade-o. In addition, the Epanechnikov Kernel weighting function was used. The bandwidth
was chosen via the (data-based) rule-of thumb bandwidth. The latter was preferred, in the
absence of any periodical patterns on the way agents behave across generations.
11The limit value of the payo for  ! 0 and  ! 0 cannot be computed, as the transition matrix is no longer
irreducible. Therefore the stationary distribution  is no longer uniquely dened.
12Here, non-stationarity refers to covariance non-stationarity under which the moments of the underlying
process are dependent on the time-lags.
151. Tit-For-Tat (STFT): (1      (1   2); + (1   2);1      (1   2); + (1   2))
The rst entry corresponds to the probability of cooperating after a
period where both agents cooperated. Agent i will cooperate
if he neither commits an implementation error (which occurs with
probability 1   ) nor a perception error (which occurs with
probability 1   ) or if he commits both a perception error and an
implementation error. Therefore, the probability of cooperating
after a period where both agents cooperated is 1      (1   2).
Analogous arguments hold for the other entries.
2. Always-Defect (SALLD): (;;;)
The fourth entry corresponds to the probability of cooperating after a
period where both agents defected. Agent i will defect unless
he commits an implementation error (which occurs with probability
). Notice that errors in perception have no eect here, as the strategy
Always-Defect does not depend on agent  i's actions. Therefore,
the probability of cooperating after a period where both agents
defected is . Analogous arguments hold for the other entries.
Table 2: Transition Rules with Errors
167.1 Evolution Of Payos
Figure 5: Average Payos
In Figure 5, local polynomial regression is used to t the average payos13 over the course
of the evolution. The payos are found to exhibit non-stationarity which can be attributed
to the dependence of the generational selection. In the early generations, the agents tend to
use machines that defect continuously. The reason is that at the start of the evolution, the
machines are generated at random. In such an environment, the best strategy is to always
defect. With the lapse of a few generations though, machines in the less error-prone treatments
achieve consistent cooperation which allows the payos to move higher. The paired-dierences
tests establish that the means of the treatments are statistically dierent at a 99% level of
signicance. The ndings are summarized in the following result:
RESULT: The incorporation of implementation and perception errors is sucient to alter
the evolution of cooperative outcomes.
13The average payos of a given generation t are calculated as the sample average of the payos of the thirty
members of the population and the thirty simulations conducted for each treatment.
177.2 Prevailing Machines
The eect of errors on the structure of the machines is an important question that has not
been addressed adequately by evolutionary game theorists. Thus, here behavioral patterns
that fare well in the simulated environments are investigated. This way a lot can be said about
the type of machines that survive or even the type of machines that do not survive in these
environments. The clear winner in the 4% and 2% treatments was the machine Always-Defect.
Always-Defect was the winner in 22 out of the 30 simulations run in the 4% treatment, and in
19 out of the 30 simulations run in the 2% treatment. The machine Always-Defect is presented
in Figure 6. Always-Defect is an open-loop machine; in other words, the actions taken at any
time-period do not depend on the actions of the opponent.
C,D
start D
Figure 6: Always-Defect
On the other hand, the structures that prevailed in the 1% and 0% treatments were diverse.
This result halts any possible attempt to discern a particular behavioral pattern that fares well
in these specic treatments. Yet, it is noteworthy that unlike the open-loop machine Always-
Defect, the diverse array of machines that prevailed in the 1% and 0% treatments were all
closed-loop (history-dependent). Thus, the eect of dierent error-levels on the structure of
the machines points towards the existence of a threshold error-level at 2%. At and above the
threshold error-level, the prevailing structures converge to the open-loop automaton Always-
Defect, whereas below the threshold, the prevailing structures are closed-loop and diverse.
187.3 Automaton Characteristics
In this subsection, broad characteristics of structures that work \reasonably well" are ascer-
tained. To that extent, it is necessary to use some summary measures of machine-behavior.
The rst summary measure is the size of the machine, which is measured by its number of
accessible states. A state is accessible if, given the machine's starting state, there is some pos-
sible combination of the opponent's possible actions that will result in a transition in that state.
Therefore, even though all machines are dened on eight states, some of these states can never
be reached. Other summary measures that shed more light to the machine-composition are
the cooperation-reciprocity and the defection-reciprocity. The cooperation-reciprocity is the
proportion of accessible states that respond to an observed cooperation by the opponent with a
cooperation. On the other hand, the defection-reciprocity is the proportion of accessible states
that respond to an observed defection by the opponent with a defection. Consequently, in this
subsection, characteristics that are important to the survival of the machines in the simulated
environments are identied. A characteristic is a property of the machines whose presence
can be objectively determined by an examination of the corresponding graph. Noticeably, the
characteristics listed are also indicators of strategic ideas underlying the machines.14
14All the statistical tables based on the tests performed can be provided by the author upon request.
19Figure 7: Average Number of Accessible States
CHARACTERISTIC 1
The average number of accessible states is decreasing in the probability of errors.
In Figure 7, local polynomial regression is used to t the average number of accessible states
per generation of the four treatments. In the rst generation, the number of accessible states of
the (randomly-generated) machines, in all four treatments, is relatively high. It is noteworthy,
that in the course of the evolution, the average number of accessible states is consistently
less in the more error-prone environments. The one-tailed-paired-dierences test performed on
the number of accessible states establishes that the means of the treatments are statistically
dierent at a 99% level of signicance. This suggests that under more error-prone treatments,
the average number of accessible states drops. Thus, if it is assumed that the average number
of accessible states is a good measure of machine-complexity, then a possible conclusion is that
strategic simplication is advantageous in the presence of errors.
20Figure 8: Cooperation-Reciprocity
CHARACTERISTIC 2
Cooperation   reciprocity is decreasing in the probability of errors.
The average cooperation-reciprocity of the four treatments is t into a local polynomial
regression in Figure 8. As the likelihood of errors increases, the machines tend to reduce their
cooperation-reciprocity. This observation also accounts for the low payos of Figure 5. The
one-tailed-paired-dierences test performed establishes that the means of the treatments are
statistically dierent at a 99% level of signicance. An alternative perspective to consider is the
proportion of accessible states that respond to an observed cooperation by the opponent with
defection; this proportion is given by the expression 1   cooperation-reciprocity. The latter
expression can be used as a proxy for the degree of sneakiness of the machines. Thus, machines
with relatively low cooperation-reciprocity are also relatively more sneaky, in the sense that they
incorporate states that shoot for the \temptation" payo more often. Such exploitation can be
camouaged in the presence of errors, but not in their absence. Thus, another characteristic of
the automata is that the degree of sneakiness is increasing in the probability of errors.
21Figure 9: Defection-Reciprocity
CHARACTERISTIC 3
Defection   reciprocity is increasing in the probability of errors.
The defection-reciprocity of the four treatments is t into a local polynomial regression in
Figure 9. The general pattern deduced is that defection is not tolerated in the error-prone
environments. The one-tailed-paired-dierences test performed establishes that the means of
the treatments are statistically dierent at a 99% level of signicance. It is noteworthy that
machines in general, are more likely to reciprocate a defection by the opponent with a defec-
tion than to cooperate after the opponent cooperates. On the other hand, the proportion of
accessible states that respond to an observed defection by the opponent with cooperation is
1   defection-reciprocity. This expression signies the degree of forgiveness of the machines.
For example, a sizable 1 defection-reciprocity indicates that the machines on average, incor-
porate quite a few states that respond to observed defections by the opponent with cooperation.
Yet, the computational experiments of Figure 9 indicate that the degree of forgiveness is de-
creasing in the probability of errors.
228 Discussion
TFT was the winner in the tournaments with error-free strategies of Robert Axelrod. The
performance of TFT lead Axelrod to identify some basic attributes that were necessary for the
emergence and survival of cooperation. These were: (i) an avoidance of unnecessary conict
by cooperating as long as the other agent does, (ii) provocation in the face of an uncalled for
defection by the other, (iii) forgiveness after responding to a provocation, and (iv) clarity of
behavior so that the other agent can adapt to your pattern of action (1984). On the other
hand, Bendor, Kramer and Stout (1991) incorporated in their computer tournament random
shocks. The winning strategy in that tournament was Nice-And-Forgiving (NAF) which diered
in many ways from TFT. First, NAF was nice in the sense that it cooperated as long as the
frequency of cooperation of the opponent was above some threshold. Second, NAF was forgiving
(generous) in the sense that although NAF would retaliate if the opponent's cooperation fell
below the threshold level of cooperation, it would revert to full cooperation before its opponent
did, as long as certain minimal levels of cooperation were met by the opponent.
Yet, the success of NAF is not a robust result but is limited to the particular ecology. As
Bendor, Kramer and Stout (1991) note, the generosity of NAF creates a risk: other strategies
may exploit NAF's willingness to give more than it receives. In other words, NAF can be
suckered by a nasty strategy that is disinterested in joint gains.15 As Axelrod and Dion (1988)
aptly note, \in the presence of large amounts of errors, there is a trade-o: unnecessary conict
can be avoided by generosity, but generosity invites exploitation". Thus, strategies that are
unilaterally generous will not fare well in every ecology. Another objection to NAF's generosity
is the lack of generalizability of this nding. With the exception of social-welfare models, where
agents are willing to exhibit generosity to increase social surplus, other models do not establish
the presence of ad hoc generosity in the agents' decisions. In the dierence-aversion models
for example, agents may be particularly sensitive and reactive to any indication that the other
party is doing better or coming out ahead. Furthermore in the reciprocity models, an agent's
generosity is likely to be inuenced by the other party's behavior. Many recent experimental
15Due to its generosity NAF lost in its pairwise play with every one of its opponents. And in contrast to NAF's
pattern, VIGILANT, the strategy that placed dead last in the tournament, beat every one of its partners in
bilateral play. VIGILANT was a highly provocable and unforgiving strategy that retaliated sharply if it inferred
that its partner was playing anything less than maximal cooperation.
23studies have demonstrated that the willingness to be generous in games is sensitive not only
to the choice set available to the agent contemplating an action, but also to the behavior of
the other agent that generated that choice set. Thus, agents are concerned not only with
the distribution of the material payo, but also with the process leading up to the available
choices at hand. Consequently, when an unfavorable outcome is attributed to the other party's
greed, individuals will abandon cooperation. Finally in the competitive (self-interest) models,
agents approach the game with a preference for outcomes that maximize the dierence between
the parties. Thus, agents with a competitive motive may be particularly unlikely to regard
generosity as an attractive or viable strategy in a PD game.
In addition, laboratory research has identied several psychological factors that might di-
minish generosity among human strategists. First, the fear of exploitation or desire to avoid
the \sucker's" payo may make it dicult for individuals to risk generosity (Kuhlman, Camac
and Cunha 1986). Experimental studies of the PD game in particular, have found that agents
will often cooperate until they have evidence or even the mere suspicion that the other party is
taking advantage of them (see discussions in Dawes and Thaler 1988). The fear of exploitation
may induce individuals to engage in a kind of defensive \stinginess" even though they recognize
the merits of generosity. Furthermore, Pedro Dal Bo and Guillaume Frechette (2011) provide
compelling experimental evidence to suggest that even in treatments where cooperation can
be supported in equilibrium, the level of cooperation may remain at low levels even after sig-
nicant experience is obtained. The authors conclude that, \these results cast doubt on the
common assumption that agents will make the most of the opportunity to cooperate whenever
it is possible to do so in equilibrium."
On the other hand, the summary measures of the present study point to a very dierent
direction from that in Bendor, Kramer and Stout (1991). In the computational experiments,
the cooperation-reciprocity of the machines is relatively low reecting their readiness to exploit
(to sneak on the opponent). In addition, it is noteworthy that the cooperation-reciprocity
decreases as the likelihood of errors increases. The reason is that an attempt to acquire the
\temptation" payo can be camouaged in the presence of errors but not in their absence.
Furthermore, in sharp contrast to NAF, the machines that evolve here are relentless punishers
of defections. In fact, the defection-reciprocity of the machines climbs to a proportion close to 1
in the environments with high levels of errors indicating their lack of forgiveness to defections.
24Of importance is also the nding that the size of the automaton is decreasing in the proba-
bility of errors. Thus, it is safe to infer that in the presence of errors, strategic simplication is
advantageous (if the number of accessible states is assumed to be a good measure of complex-
ity). In the presence of errors, behavior is governed by mechanisms that restrict the exibility
to choose potential actions. These mechanisms simplify behavior to less complex patterns,
which are easier for an observer to recognize and predict. In the absence of errors, the behavior
of well-informed agents responding with exibility to every perturbation in the environment
does not produce easily recognizable patterns, but rather is extremely dicult to predict.
In real-life, there exist a number of examples where agents' choice of simple strategies (rules
of thumb) in the presence of stochasticity, has proved quite successful. An interesting example
is the publishing history on strategies to win at blackjack. Books in the 60s and 70s emphasized
sophisticated card-counting and bet-variation methods (see especially Edward Thorpe's book,
Beat the Dealer). However, while no one has challenged the mathematical validity of these
earlier more complex methods, their actual use resulted in worse performance by most persons
attempting to use them (which generated sizable unexpected prots to the casinos). As a result,
later books have steadily evolved towards more rigidly-structured methods (for example, the
books No Need to Count and Winning Casino Blackjack for the Non-Counter).
In other occasions, agents apply rules of thumb when they nd it too cumbersome to have
perplex decision rules to accommodate for the dierent contingencies that might arise. Consider
for example, the Taylor's rule which is used as a monetary-policy criterion to stipulate how much
the central bank should change the nominal interest rate in response to divergences of actual
ination rates from target ination rates, and of actual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from
potential GDP. The rule can be written as:
it = t + r
?
t + (t   
?
t) + y(yt    yt) (2)
where it is the target short-term nominal interest rate, t is the rate of ination as measured by
the GDP deator, ?
t is the desired rate of ination, r?
t is the assumed equilibrium real interest
rate, yt is the logarithm of real GDP, and  yt is the logarithm of potential output, as determined
by a linear trend.
Also, consider the over 43 trillion possible initial positions from which to unscramble the
Rubic's cube. Minimizing the number of moves to solve the cube would require an extremely
25complex pattern of adjustment from one particular scrambled position to another. Yet, if mis-
takes are made in trying to select a shortcut, the cube may remain unscrambled indenitely.
Consequently, cube experts have developed rigidly-structured-solving procedures that employ
a small repertoire of solving patterns to unscramble the cube. These procedures follow a pre-
determined hierarchical sequence that is largely independent of the initial scrambled position.
However, they almost always require a much longer sequence of moves than the minimum
number needed to unscramble the cube. This example illustrates an important point; allowing
exibility to react to information or to select actions will not necessarily improve performance
if there is uncertainty about how to use the information or about when to select particular ac-
tions. Thus, an agent's overall performance may actually be improved by restricting exibility
to use information or to choose particular actions.
9 Conclusion
The study indicates, via an explicit evolutionary process simulated by the genetic algorithm,
that the incorporation of bounded rationality, in the form of implementation and perception
errors in the agents' machines, is sucient to alter the evolution of cooperative machines. In
addition, the study identies a threshold error-level. At and above the threshold error-level, the
prevailing structures converge to the open-loop machine Always-Defect. On the other hand,
below the threshold, the prevailing structures are closed-loop and diverse, which impedes any
inferential projections on the superiority of a particular machine. Yet, the analysis still identies
some broad characteristics of the structures that work \reasonably well". The complexity of
the machines for one, is decreasing in the probability of errors. Thus, strategic simplication is
advantageous in the presence of errors. Furthermore, the prevailing structures tend to exhibit
low cooperation-reciprocity and high defection-reciprocity. Overall, these results show that the
evolution of cooperative machines is considerably weaker than expected, while the change in
the model is ecologically plausible: errors are common in our strategic interactions.
A wide variety of potential extensions exist. In this study, it was assumed that all machines
were subjected to the same likelihood of errors, generation by generation. Instead, the likelihood
of errors could be contingent upon the number of states accessed by the particular machine. The
26rationale is that a machine that contains only one state (say, Always Cooperate) is less likely
to commit errors than one that is far more complex. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
examine whether the results are robust to the symmetry of the payos. One of the basic features
of the conventional Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game is the requirement that the values assigned
to the game are the same for both agents. Not uncommon however, are social transactions
where not only is each agent's outcome dependent upon the choices of the other, but also
where the resources and therefore possible rewards of one agent exceed those of the other. A
social interaction characterized by a disparity in resources and potentially larger rewards for
one of the two participants would in all likelihood call into play questions of inequality. Thus,
one could run two co-evolving populations with asymmetric payos to see how the asymmetry
in payos aects cooperation under the simulated environments.
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